1965 war: THE INSIDE STORY

Book Review

Reviewer: Umar Bashir
Book Name: 1965 war: The Inside Story (Defence Minister Y. B. Chavan’s Diary of India-Pakistan War)
Author: R. D. PRADHAN
Pages: 141
Publisher: Atlantic Publishers & Distributors Pvt. Ltd.
Price: n/a

The Author of the Book, R. D. Pradhan, has served as the Private Secretary to the Indian Defence Minister Y. B. Chavan during the war, and reveals the ‘Higher Direction of War’ in the book.

The Book is based on the events of 1965 war between India and Pakistan, as recorded by the then Indian Defence Minister Y. B. Chavan in his day-to-day Diary. The Author, R. D. Pradhan, has divided the book into two parts. The part first discusses the Military Operations of India & Pakistan during the war, while as part second is about the United Nations' (UN) and other diplomatic interventions to end the war.

According to the author, Pakistan had developed a four phase strategy to capture Kashmir by force.

The book is constructed on day-to-day basis, describing what happened on each day of the war. The Author describes events, behavior of key personalities, political as well as military, and their attitude during the military operations and diplomatic efforts to bring about the ceasefire. The book also tells about the psychological upheaval of those who directed the war operations (from Indian side).

Pak Offensive:

According to author, Pakistan had developed a four phase strategy to capture Kashmir by force. The first consisted of a ‘probing encounter’ in some place of Pakistan’s choosing (later known as ‘Operation Desert Hawk’ which took place in the Runn of Kutch); the second, an all-out, but disguised invasion in Kashmir (later known as ‘Operation Gibraltar’); the third was a full-scale army assault by the Pakistan Army in the Chhamb (Jammu-Akhnor) Sector to cut off the Indian supply line to J&K (later known as ‘Operation Grand Slam’) and finally, the massive armored attack to capture Amritsar, and as much of other Indian territory as possible to be exchanged eventually for Kashmir.

Pakistan launched the first phase of its strategy to capture/liberate Kashmir, known as ‘Operation Desert Hawk’, in the Runn of Kutch, in March 1965, and launched ‘Operation Gibraltar ‘in early August (1-5 August) 1965 in Kashmir. Under Operation Gibraltar, Pakistani regular army personnel disguised as civilians, penetrated into the valley and were tasked to capture important governmental installations with the help of local population [P:05]. But according to the author, ‘Operation Gibraltar’ utterly failed, as the local population reported the whereabouts of the infiltrators to the army, and the infiltrators were neutralized in small encounters by Indian patrols. These encounters took place in places like: Uri, Poonch, Gulmarg, etc. India responded to the ‘Operation Gibraltar’ by capturing the Haji-Pir Bulge in PAK (Azad Kashmir) after several failed attempts between 18th and 27th August. [P: 08]

After Indian failure to capture Lahore, on the evening of 8th September, two great Tank Battles were at the work almost at the same time: One in the Khem Karan sector (Assal Uttar) and the other in Sialkot sector (Chawinda).

After the failure of ‘Operation Gibraltar’, on 31st August, India’s assessment was that Pakistan, according to its plan, would intensify infiltration campaign in Jhamdar- Naushera Sector. But, to India’s utter surprise, on 1st September 1965, Pakistan launched a ‘Division Level Armoured attack (by Pakistan’s 12 infantry Division), known as ‘Operation Grand Slam’ in Chhamb sector. Pakistan’s aim was to capture Akhnoor (in Jammu) and thus cut India’s only road link to the valley. The author accepts India’s gross Intelligence failure to know the timing of Pakistan’s attack. [P: 11]

Indian forces could not withstand this timely assault by Pakistan Army and withdrew towards Akhnoor town. Pakistani forces crossed the river Tawi and had reached at shouting distance from Aknoor on the evening of 1st September. However, to India’s surprise, the Pakistanis did not advance till the afternoon of 3rd September. Later on, this turned out to be one of the turning points of the war [P: 25]. During the lull, Indian forces received reinforcements, regrouped and stopped the Pakistani advance. However, Pakistani forces overran Indian defenses again in Jaurian and captured it [P: 36]. In the evening, India faced the grave danger of losing the only road link to Kashmir.

India Counter Offensive:

The situation was taking a bad turn for India. According to author, on the orders of Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, Indian launched its counter offensive called ‘Operation Riddle’ and crossed the International Border in Punjab towards Lahore on the intervening night of 5th September. Indian forces (XI Corps) could not capture Lahore but rather were routed near the Ichhogil Canal by the Pakistani tanks and Pakistan Air Force (PAF) [P: 43]. In the Chapter ‘Of Cowardice and Panic’, the author has quoted an incident that during the operation, the Commanding Officer (CO) of 15 Division, Major Gen. Niranjan Prasad, had lost his metal balance, and was then found hiding in a recently irrigated Sugar cane field, after fleeing the battle field.

After Indian failure to capture Lahore, on the evening of 8th September, two great Tank Battles were at the work almost at the same time: One in the Khem Karan sector (Assal Uttar) and the other in Sialkot sector (Chawinda).

In Khem Karan sector, Pakistani forces launched an armored attack on the village Assal Uttar. However, due to tall crops and strong Indian defense, the Pakistani attack failed. According to the author, during the intervening night of 11 September 1965, Pakistanis had fled the battle field and 25 tanks were found in the waterlogged sugar cane fields. India won the Tank Battle of Assal Uttar and successfully stalled the Pakistan’s advance towards Amritsar. However, Pakistan still managed to capture the Khem Karan town. The author narrates an interesting incident when the Indian Army’s 4th Mountain Division, flushed with the success of Assal Uttar, launched an attack on Pakistani forces in Khem Karan town, during the night of 12th September 1965. During their advance, the Indian troops lost their way and found themselves surrounded by Pakistani tanks in the morning. India lost around 300 men in ensuing battle. [P: 54-56]

In Sialkot Sector, another important Tank battle took place at Chawinda. India had launched simultaneous attacks on Lahore and Sialkot sectors on 6th September 1965, under ‘Operation Riddle’, to stop the Pakistani advance in Chhamb and Khem Karan Sector. However, Indian forces could not gain any major ground in Sialkot sector (like in Lahore sector).

Indian and Pakistani tanks met in Chawinda, where Pakistani Patton tanks routed Indian defenses, and Indian advance towards Sialkot was halted. Pakistan won the Tank Battle of Chawinda. The author however contends that it was a stalemate, and rather mentions the destruction of Pakistani Pattons in the village of Phillora in Sialkot (which took place before the actual Tank Battle at Chawinda). However, he mentions that there were heavy losses on both sides in the battle of Chawinda and the progress in the Sialkot Sector was overall disappointing for India [P: 61-62]. The Battle of Chawinda lasted till 19th September.

End of the War:

According to author, by 21st September, it was apparent that neither side could achieve a decisive victory. He writes that India had captured 720 square miles of Pak territory, while Pakistan held about 400 square miles of Indian Territory in addition to the considerable territory along the Rajasthan border [P: 81].

By this time, the theatre of operation had shifted from battle field to diplomacy. United Nations General Secretary, U. Thant had proposed a ceasefire on 6th September. And with the mediation of UN, USSR, USA and UK, the ceasefire was agreed upon by both warring countries on 23rd September 1965, and the war finally ended with the Tashkent Agreement between Pak President Gen. Ayyub Khan and Indian PM Lal Bahadur Shastri in January 1966.

The Narrative:

I found the book to be the amalgam of genuine honest narratives from the 1965 Indo-Pak war. The author very openly accepts India’s victories and defeats on battle front and in the diplomacy. The author praises the very brave roles played by Indian Defence Minister Y. B. Chavan during the war. The author also regrets that India could not utilize its full war machine during the war as it faced Chinese threats on the Eastern Border. However, the narrative in the book is one sided, and it would be interesting to read about the war from Pakistani perspective.

Finally, after claiming the Indian victory in the overall context of the war, the author finishes with the following assessment of the war:

“At the end of the war, the status of J&K and CFL remained unsettled and a source of future trouble. It had been a war to no purpose. India could claim to have defeated Pak designs on Kashmir while Pakistan boasted about halting an invasion of Pakistan by a larger Indian Army. Both sides were content to claim victory to their people.”

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